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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with the questions of whether self-regulatory bodies are judicially 
reviewable and whether, on the basis of theoretical and practical considerations, 
they should be subject to judicial public law scrutiny. 
Self-regulatory bodies may be subjected to judicial review both in New Zealand 
and in England. The tests of susceptibility to review applied in these two 
jurisdictions are vague and lack conceptual coherence. In New Zealand, judicial 
review proceedings may be brought against a self-regulatory body which is 
carrying out a public function. While the meaning of "public function" is 
uncertain, it is clear that in New Zealand, unlike in England, a self-regulatory 
body can be subject to judicial review even if the government has no direct or 
implied involvement in its activities. 
This paper contends that the alternative mechanisms by which self-regulatory 
bodies can be held accountable are inadequate considering the nature and scope of 
the power which these bodies may wield. It proposes that self-regulatory bodies 
should be subject to public law standards of decision-making since they operate, 
or purport to operate, in the public interest. Subjecting self-regulatory bodies to 
judicial review is consistent with the theoretical basis of the judiciary's public law 
supervisory role. The application of judicial review principles to these private 
entities will not undermine the advantages of self-regulation unless the courts apply 
the traditional grounds of review too strictly, without taking account of the 
particular environment in which self-regulatory bodies operate. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,800 words. 
iii 
I INTRODUCTION 
A self-regulatory scheme is one in wh~ch competing industry participants develop 
and enforce rules which govern their behaviour in the market. The member 
organisations confer the power to administer the scheme on a self-regulatory body. 
These self-regulatory bodies may exercise significant regulatory power over the 
member organisations. They may also exert power over third parties in some 
circumstances. This paper is concerned with judicial review as a means of 
controlling the exercise of power by self-regulatory bodies. 
Self-regulation is already well established in some sectors of the economy. The 
Banking Ombudsman, the Insurance and Savings Ombudsman and the Advertising 
Standards Complaints Board are examples of self-regulatory bodies. Since self-
regulation is a natural consequence of the state's retreat from the market, the 
voluntary establishment of private sector ombudsman-type self-regulatory bodies 
is likely to become an increasingly common phenomenon.
1 The Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs is actively promoting self-regulation as a more effective means 
of controlling market practices than regulation by government agencies. 
2 
Judicial review is traditionally concerned with controlling power exerted by 
governmental bodies. Very little consideration has been given to whether power 
exerted elsewhere in society should also be subject to judicial review given that its 
effects on individuals is comparable in some situations. 3
 Sir Ivor Richardson has 
observed that lawyers: 4 
1 Dr RE Harrison "Deregulation, Privatisation and Corporatisation of Crown Activity: How will 
the Law Respond?" (New Zealand Law Conference: The Law and Politics, Wellington, March 
1993) 102, 108. 
2 Ministry of Consumer Affairs Market Self-Regulation and Codes of Practice: Number Three in 
a Series of Policy Papers (Wellington, 1997) ll. 
3 R Cranson "Reviewing Judicial Review" in G Richardson and H Geno (eds) Administrative Law 
and Government Action: The Courts and Alternative Mechanisms of Review (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1994) 45, 46. 
4 Sir I Richardson "Changing Needs for Judicial Decision-Making" (1991) 1 Journal of Judicial 
Administration 61, 63. 
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.. . have hardly begun to explore the philosophical approaches underpinning 
various branches of the law [including administrative law] to bring legal thinking 
into line with changed economic, social, political and administrative thought in 
[New Zealand]. 
The confusion apparent in the English and New Zealand case law on the 
amenability of self-regulatory bodies to judicial review reflects this dearth of 
principle. The judiciary is unsure of its proper role in controlling the exercise of 
power in society. The decentralisation of public power has raised important 
questions about the distinction between public and private law. 
The nature of self-regulatory bodies is described in part II of this paper. Part III 
examines the basis on which these bodies may be subjected to judicial review in 
New Zealand and England. Whether self-regulatory bodies can justifiably be 
subjected to the judiciary's public supervisory jurisdiction is discussed in part IV. 
This involves an examination of the alternative mechanisms of accountability 
available in respect of such bodies, the theoretical underpinnings of judicial 
review, and the practical implications of subjecting self-regulatory bodies to 
judicial review. Parts V, VI and Vri deal with issues of standing and judicial 
review grounds and remedies as they relate to public law supervision of these 
bodies. The conclusion is stated in part VIII. 
II SELF-REGULATORY BODIES 
A Definition 
In this paper, the term "self-regulatory bodies" refers only to non-statutory and 
non-governmental entities. Bodies are described as "self-regulatory" if they 
comprise, at least in part, of members who engage in the activities which they seek 
to regulate. The members of the bodies have a common interest in maintaining 
standards within their particular fields of endeavour. Some self-regulatory bodies, 
2 
such as the Banking Ombudsman, have the power to adjudicate on complaints 
received against member organisations. They exercise discretionary power 
according to codes of practice which have been devised by the industries within 
which they operate. These entities usually have the authority to discipline 
members who fall short of the standards set in the codes. A key defining feature 
of self-regulatory bodies is that they operate, or purport to operate, in the public 
interest. 5 This is not to say that self-r_egulation does not have advantages for the 
industries which operate such a system. 
Self-regulatory bodies are established for a number of reasons. An industry may 
take the initiative to set up and operate a self-regulatory body to enhance the public 
image of its member organisations. Alternatively, the threat of legislative 
restrictions may prompt an industry to establish a self-regulatory regime. The 
threat of severe statutory restrictions on advertising, for example, has resulted in 
a high degree of commitment to self-regulation in the New Zealand advertising 
industry. It is to the industry's advantage to ensure that products such as breast 
milk substitutes, diet foods, toys and financial products are advertised responsibly. 
The industry avoids strict legislative controls by demonstrating to the government 
that it can perform this important regulatory function itself. The existence of the 
scheme allows the advertising industry. to credibly dismiss lobby groups' calls for 
severe restrictions on certain types of advertising.
6 
B Advantages of Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation has a number of advantages over government regulation as a means 
of controlling the behaviour of goods and service providers in the market. 
7 Codes 
of practice are easily adapted to reflect changing market conditions. Statute-based 
5 See AC Page "Self-Regulation: The Constitutional Dimension" (1986) 49 Modem Law Review 
141, 164; Ministry of Consumer Affairs Guideline on Developing a Code of Practice (Wellington,
 
1993) 1. 
6 G Wiggs, Executive Director, Advertising Standards Authority "The Role and Value of Business 
Self-Regulation" (Unpublished Essay, 1996) 1-7. 
7 See n 2 above, 7-8. 
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government regulatory systems are, by contrast, inherently inflexible because the 
process of legislative amendment is so cumbersome. 
A self-regulatory system's code of practice may be interpreted according to its 
spirit. This means that member organisations may not use technical loopholes to 
avoid abiding by the standards embodied in the code. The avoidance of "black-
letter lawyering" is thus an attractive feature of self-regulation as compared to 
statutory, governmental regulation. 
8 
Self-regulatory systems can provide low-cost and accessible complaints and 
disputes resolution mechanisms. A code of practice may be drafted in non-
legalistic language which is readily understood by the public and member 
organisations. It is less alienating than a piece of legislation. Self-regulatory 
schemes may encourage compliance to a greater extent than governmental 
regulation. This is because of the commitment fostered by "ownership" of the 
scheme and the associated code. Self-regulation provides an opportunity for an 
industry sector to place the principles of general consumer law into the context of 
the particular field of activity. Regulatory legislation is usually universal and is 
therefore drafted in general terms. The rules in an industry-specific code of 
practice may be expressed more pragmatically. 
C Key Features 
Wiggs has identified several features which ensure the success of the self-
regulatory model. 9 Justice must be done and must be seen to be done. 
Complaints must be dealt with fairly, efficiently and without bias in favour of the 
self-regulatory body's members. If the adjudication panel fails to do this, the body 
will lose public credibility. If a body operating in a significant sector of the 
economy is not upholding the public interest, the government may replace it with 
a statutory system. Self-regulatory bodies are inevitably vulnerable to the criticism 
8 Above n 6, 7. 
9 Above n 6, 3-7. 
4 
that they favour their own members ahead of the public. Appearances are 
therefore very important. The criticism can be curbed by ensuring that the public 
is adequately represented in the self-regulatory body. Consumer organisations are 
frequently asked to nominate public members to participate in the operation of the 
body. Self-regulatory bodies must operate transparently to engender the 
confidence of the public and government. They can achieve this by releasing all 
decisions to the media. Wiggs suggests that undertaking wide consultation on new 
and revised codes is an important means of enhancing confidence. Wiggs takes 
the view that the Executive Director and staff of the self-regulatory body should 
not have had previous involvement in the industry to reinforce its independence. 
Wiggs identifies the commitment of member organisations to self-regulation as a 
key determinant of the success of self-regulation. This is not surprising 
considering that a private organisation has no inherent authority to exert regulatory 
power. The jurisdiction of a self-regulatory body is founded upon the consent of 
its members. The collective nature of the power exerted by self-regulatory bodies 
is the hallmark of these entities. 10 
D Nature and Scope of Power Ex.ened 
Private bodies exert power in the sense that their acts and decisions may affect the 
interests of third parties. This may be referred to as market power, since the 
behaviour of these entities in the market may affect the economic position of those 
who come within their spheres of influence. The board of directors of a large 
company exerts enormous power when it decides to close a processing plant in an 
area of high unemployment, for example. The exercise of such power is subject 
to private law. An individual aggrieved by the negligent exercise of private 
power, for example, may seek a remedy in tort. A competitor aggrieved by the 
anti-competitive behaviour of a private entity may seek redress under the 
Commerce Act 1986. 
10 J Black "Constitutionalising Self-Regulation" (1996) 59 Modem Law Review 24, 27; AC Page, 
above n 5, 144. 
5 
Regulatory as opposed to market power is normally associated with governme
ntal 
bodies. The regulatory power of these bodies is conferred by statute, since pri
vate 
entities are required by law to submit to their regulatory jurisdictions. Most pr
ivate 
entities, on the other hand, lack the authority to control the activities of ot
hers 
through regulation. Self-regulatory bodies, as private entities performin
g a 
regulatory function, are therefore something of an anomaly. The question a
rises 
whether the public law standards of good administration applied to governme
ntal 
bodies in judicial review should also apply to self-regulatory bodies. 
The entities which self-regulatory bodies may control fall into two dis
tinct 
categories. First, they have the discretionary power to control their mem
ber 
organisations. This power may be conferred by the member organisations thro
ugh 
contracts with the self-regulatory body, as in the case of the Banking Ombudsm
an, 
or by informal agreement, as in the case of the Advertising Standards Autho
rity. 
Secondly, self-regulatory bodies may indirectly affect non-members who ope
rate 
within their spheres of influence. For example, in adjudicating on whethe
r its 
members may publish certain advertisements, the Advertising Stand
ards 
Complaints Board indirectly controls advertisers' access to publication. Th
is is 
because the Board controls a significant proportion of New Zealand's adverti
sing 
media. Advertisers are potentially subject to the Board's non-statu
tory 
jurisdiction even though they have not agreed to submit to it. 
ID ARE SELF-REGULATORY BODIES JUDICIALLY REVIEW ABLE
? 
A The Position in England 
Prior to the ground-breaking decision of Council of Civil Service Unions v Min
ister 
for the Civil Service, 11 the position in England was that judicial review 
was 
available only in respect of the exercise of statutory power. The House of L
ords 
II [1985] 1 AC 374. 
6 
in that case extended the scope of judicial review to the exercise of prerogative 
power. The nature and subject-matter of the power, not its source, were 
considered to be determinative of whether judicial review was available in respect 
of the Executive's acts and decisions. 12 
The activities of private bodies were not considered to be susceptible to judicial 
review until 1987. In that year, the English Court of Appeal heralded an 
expansionist approach to the scope of judicial review in the watershed decision of 
R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc.
13 The court 
unanimously held that the High Court had jurisdiction to review the Panel's 
decisions, even though the powers which the body exercised were derived neither 
from statute nor from the prerogative. As in Council of Civil Service Unions, the 
court rejected the source of power as the sole indicator of amenability to judicial 
review, 14 but took a giant leap by subjecting a non-governmental body to its 
public law scrutiny. Sir John Donaldson MR formulated the test of amenability 
to judicial review as follows: 15 
Possibly the only essential elements are what can be described as a public 
element, which can take many different forms , and the exclusion from the 
jurisdiction of bodies whose sole source of power is consensual submission to its 
jurisdiction. 
At its broadest, the Datafin principle could therefore be said to be that a private 
body carrying out a public function may be susceptible to judicial review unless 
it derives its power exclusively from contract. 
The judgment gives no real guidance as to what constitutes a public function or 
12 Above n 11,407 (per Lord Scarman), 409-410 (per Lord Diplock), 417-418 (per Lord Roskill). 
13 [1987] QB 815. 
14 Above n 13, 838 (per Sir John Donaldson MR), 847 (per Lloyd U). 
15 Above n 13, 838. 
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element. A "governmental interest" test has emerged in the case law
16 and has 
superseded the public element indicator of amenability to judicial review. The 
courts apply a "but for" test, where they consider whether the government would 
step in to regulate the activity in question if it were not for the existence of the 
decision-making body. This test precluded judicial review in the English Court of 
Appeal decision of R v Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great 
Britain and the Commonwealth, ex pane Wachmann, 
17 in which the applicant 
sought judicial review of the disciplinary functions of a Chief Rabbi who had 
declared him unfit to continue in his rabbinical office. The court dismissed the 
application on the basis that the government has no interest in regulating religious 
life. The courts also ask whether the self-regulatory body is woven into a system 
of governmental control. The courts look for evidence that the regulatory system 
"which, although itself non-statutory, is nevertheless supported by statutory powers 
and penalties clearly indicative of government concern". 
18 This focus on the 
context of the body's powers rather than on the nature of its functions is a 
narrowing of the Data.fin principle. 
The tentatively stated rule in Data.fin that bodies which derive their authority solely 
from consensual submission to their jurisdiction will be immune from judicial 
review has been successfully invoked by a number of institutions seeking to avoid 
judicial scrutiny. In R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex pane Aga 
Khan, 19 the court was heavily influenced by the fact that the Club's source of 
power was contractual in deciding that the disciplinary committee was immune 
from the court's supervisory jurisdiction. Similarly in R v Insurance Ombudsman 
Bureau and the Insurance Ombudsman, ex pane Aegon Life Assurance Ltd, 
20 the 
court held that the contractual source of the Ombudsman's power precluded 
16 R v Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain and the Commonwealth, 
ex parte Wachmann [1992] 1 WLR 1036; R v Football Association, ex parte Football League 
[1993] 2 All ER 833; R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 
1 WLR 909. 
17 Above n 16. 
18 Wachmann, above n 16, 1041. 
19 Above n 16. 
20 Unreported, 16 December 1993, Divisional Court, C01609/93 (Lexis Transcript). 
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judicial review. 
Whether any particular self-regulatory body is susceptible to judicial review in 
England is still very uncertain. The flexible approach to assessing susceptibility 
to judicial review espoused by Rose J in Aegon Life Assurance Ltd has left the 
courts with enormous discretion as to the scope of judicial review. The conceptual 
deficiency of the tests which have emerged introduces even further uncertainty. 
The "but for" test may provide a strong case for subjecting to judicial review a 
self-regulatory body which was established in response to a government threat to 
impose a statutory scheme. Cane, however, points out that if evidence were 
required that the government would step in but for the existence of the body, this 
would exclude from judicial review those regulatory schemes to which the 
government had simply not turned its mind.
21 The "but for" test is an attempt 
to anchor the broadened scope of judicial review to its traditional arena, which is 
the exercise of power by government. It does not, however, provide a 
conceptually coherent basis for determining amenability to judicial review. The 
"governmental interest" test is similarly deficient. 
B The Position in New Zealand 
1 Judicature Amendment Act 1972 and common law judicial review 
In New Zealand, judicial review is available both at common law and under the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972 ("the JAA").
22 The JAA offers a simplified 
procedure for review by the High Court but was not intended to extend the scope 
of review beyond that which is available at common law.
23 The JAA has, 
however, been interpreted to have a substantive effect on the scope of the 
21 P Cane "Self-Regulation and Judicial Review" [1987] Civil Justice Quarterly 324, 33
8. 
22 Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New 'Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 3
85, 388. 
23 NZPD, vol 414, 3311, 3313, 3315, 28 September 1977; G Taylor Judicial Review
: A New 
'Zealand Perspective (Butterworths, Wellington, 1991) 31; M Taggart "State-Owned En
terprises and 
Social Responsibility: A Contradiction in Terms?" [1993] New Zealand Recent Law 
Review 343, 
358. . 
9 
judiciary's power of review. Justice Cooke in the Court of Appeal decision of 
Budget Rent A Car Ltd v Auckland Regional Authority opined that the J AA might 
confer a wider scope of review on the New Zealand courts than is allowed at 
common law. 24 This analysis seems strained in light of section 4 of the JAA 
which limits the situations in which the court may grant relief to those in which 
the applicant would have been entitled to relief at common law. There does not 
seem to be any room for an interpretation that the section confers power to review 
in circumstances where the court could not have reviewed at common law. 
Taggart does not believe the jurisdiction-conferring interpretation of the JAA to 
be correct since it implies that the High Court's inherent jurisdiction is susceptible 
to legislative modification. The judiciary, as the guardian of the constitutional 
principle of access to the courts, is slow to accept this proposition in relation to 
privative clauses and would similarly resist erosion of its powers of judicial 
review. 25 
Parliament clearly did not intend the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction to be 
limited to those bodies which derive their powers from legislation or the 
prerogative. The JAA provides that the court may grant relief "in relation to the 
exercise, refusal to exercise, or proposed or purported exercise by any person of 
a statutory power". 26 The definition of a 
II statutory power", since an amendment 
passed in 1977, includes "a power or right conferred by or under. .. the 
constitution ... rules or by laws of any body corporate ... 
11
• 
27 "Person" is defined 
in section 3 to include "a body of persons whether incorporated or not. .. ". The 
JAA mechanism of review is therefore potentially available in respect of self-
regulatory bodies if they are incorporated. The availability of judicial review at 
common law does not hinge on incorporation but, as under the JAA, requires the 
existence of a public element. 
24 [1985) 2 NZLR 414, 418. 
25 M Taggart, above n 23, 358-359. 
26 Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 4. 
27 Above n 26, s 3. 
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2 Approach to Data.fin 
Although never directly at issue, the Data.fin principle that a 
private organisation 
exercising a public function is potentially susceptible to 
judicial review has been 
cited with approval in a number of cases. Justice Tippin
g in O'Regan v Lousich 
agreed that a public law remedy is available in respect o
f the exercise of a public 
power. 28 Justice Fisher in the High Court decision of
 Peters v Collinge stated 
that 11 [i]n some special situations a private body may be s
ubject to non-contractual 
judicial review, for example where it exercises quasi-pu
blic functions ... 
11 
•
29 The 
same judge opined in Waitakere City v Waitemata Electricity S
hareholders that "it 
is undoubtedly the case that in limited circumstances som
e non-contractual public 
law grounds can be invoked against a voluntary or com
mercial organisation, for 
example where the organisation ... exercises quasi-public
 functions ... 
11
• 
3° Kelsey, 
it seems, was overly conservative when she observed th
at: 31 
In New Zealand, the judicial climate and restrained appro
ach to judicial review 
suggest the chances of any substantial broadening of its sc
ope to the private sector 
- let alone of such claims being successful - are slim. 
In New Zealand as in England, the availability of a cont
ractual remedy precludes 
judicial review. In Peters v Collinge3
2 for example, the applicant sought judicial 
review of the New Zealand National Party executive's de
cision to expel him from 
the political party. His application failed because it was
 open to him to pursue a 
contractual claim based on the party's constitution which
 was in effect a contract 
between its members. It seems, therefore, that judicial re
view of a self-regulatory 
body is not available to member organisations who hav
e contractually agreed to 
abide by its rulings. 
28 [1995] 2 NZLR 620, 629. 
29 [1993] 2 NZLR 554, 566. 
30 [1996] 2 NZLR 735, 747. 
31 J Kelsey Rolling Back the State: Privatisation of Power in
 Aotearoa/ New Zealand (Bridget 
Williams Books Ltd, Wellington, 1993) 206. 
32 Above n 29. 
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2 The Electoral Commission v Cameron 
The Court of Appeal in its recent decision of The Electora
l Commission v 
Cameron stated in obiter that the decisions of the Advert
ising Standards 
Complaints Board, a self-regulatory b9(iy, are amenable to ju
dicial review under 
the JAA. 33 
(a) The/acts 
The Advertising Standards Complaints Board is constituted u
nder the rules of the 
Advertising Standards Authority ("the Society"), which is an i
ncorporated society. 
The Society is made up of representative groups of the 
advertising industry 
including newspaper and magazine publishers, radio and
 television service 
operators and advertising agents. It appoints four adv
ertising industry 
representatives and four members (including the chairman
) from outside the 
industry to the Board. The Board rules on complaints by re
ference to a code of 
advertising practice which the Society formulated after wid
e consultation with 
interest groups and relevant government officials. The Bo
ard may rule that a 
particular advertisement not be published or that publication c
ease as the case may 
be. The court acknowledged that members of the Society
 may not be legally 
bound to comply with the Board's rulings, but attached muc
h importance to the 
fact that they have to date always complied as a matter of in
dustry practice. 
The Electoral Commission is a statutory body which has the 
promotion of public 
awareness of electoral matters as one of its primary responsibi
lities. In preparation 
for the first MMP election, the Commission arranged to ha
ve an advertisement 
published which included the statement "The more party vo
tes a party gets, the 
more seats it gets in Parliament". A second advertisement
 contained a similar 
statement. A Mr Balani, a member of the Voters' Organ
isation for Tactical 
Education, complained to the Board on the basis that th
e statements in the 
33 The Electoral Commission v Cameron Unreported, 16 April 19
97, Court of Appeal, CA 232/96, 
12. Although made in the context of a judicial review applicatio
n, the statement was obiter because 
the court dealt with the issues before it on the basis of the Dec
laratory Judgments Act 1908. 
12 
advertisements were inaccurate. Th
e advertisements failed to acknowled
ge that 
more votes would not necessarily tran
slate to more seats in every case. Th
e Board 
found that the advertisements were i
n breach of the "Truthful Presentatio
n" rule 
in the Advertising Code of Ethics. 
The advertisements were withdrawn
 as a 
result. The Commission did not see
k to exercise its right to appeal the 
Board's 
decision to the Appeal Board. 
The Commission applied for an i
nterim declaration suspending the 
Board's 
decision. In its original statement o
f claim, it alleged that the Board ha
d acted 
illegally and unreasonably in fetterin
g the legal right and duty of the Com
mission 
to promote public awareness of electo
ral matters. The Commission later am
ended 
this statement of claim and withdrew
 the application for an interim decla
ration. 
The case proceeded as an applicatio
n by the Commission for judicial re
view to 
clarify whether, in the exercise of it
s function of promoting public aware
ness of 
electoral matters, its advertising is t
o be subject to the regulatory jurisdi
ction of 
the Board. The Commission sought a
n order prohibiting the Board and the
 Society 
from exercising any authority in rela
tion to its public education activities.
 
(b) The judgment 
The parties to the proceedings, the B
oard, the Society, the Newspaper Pu
blishers 
Association and the Electoral Comm
ission, all agreed that the decisions 
of the 
Board were in principle amenable to j
udicial review. The Solicitor-Genera
l argued 
that by imposing (at least in a de f
acto sense) collective standard-settin
g upon 
advertisers, essentially across all ma
jor media groups, the Society and th
e Board 
were exercising a public power. T
his broad regulatory regime with c
oercive 
effect, derived from collective practi
ce should, it was submitted, be rega
rded no 
differently from that of the Take-Ov
er Panel. This body was held by the
 English 
Court of Appeal to be exercising pu
blic powers and to therefore be ame
nable to 
judicial review in the Data.fin case. 
The court agreed that the Board w
as subject to review, but arrived 
at this 
conclusion after a rather confused an
alysis. It dismissed the value of draw
ing an 
13 
analogy between the collective regulatory power of the Board and that wielded by 
the Take-Over Panel in Datafin. "A more direct route available in New Zealand 
is to be found in the Judicature Amendment Act 1972"
34 according to the court. 
This was a curious comment considering that satisfaction of the elements of section 
4 of the JAA is insufficient to confer a judicial review jurisdiction in the absence 
of a public element. However the court addressed the public nature of the Board's 
functions in other parts of the judgment. It was clear that the court did in fact 
consider the Board to be exercising a public function, and that this was a 
prerequisite for the application of public law principles. The basis of the court's 
finding that the Board exercises public power was not expressly articulated. 
Presumably it was based on its observation that "the Board exercises a regulatory 
function by which it determines what advertising is or is not communicated to the 
public by substantially the whole of the media throughout the country" .
35 The 
public quality attributed to the Board's power seems to have been based on the 
pervasiveness of its influence. The public nature of the Board's role, according 
to the court, was confirmed by the statutory recognition of its regulatory role. 
This statutory recognition appears in section 8 of the Broadcasting Act 1989, 
which demarcates the jurisdiction of the Board and the statutory Broadcasting 
Standards Authority in respect of advertising programmes. 
36 It is clear from the 
judgment, however, that the court would probably have found that the Board 
fulfilled a public role even without such statutory recognition. 
37 
Although the case fell within the court's judicial review jurisdiction under section 
4 of the JAA, it resolved the case with a declaration under the Declaratory 
Judgments Act 1908 without resort to judicial review. 
Under the code, the jurisdiction of the Board is to be exercised in relation to 
34 Above n 33, 12. 
35 Above n 33, 3. 
36 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 8(2) provides that the Broadcasting Standards Authority has jurisdiction 
only where neither the broadcaster nor the advertiser recognises the jurisdiction of the Board in 
relation to a particular complaint regarding an advertising programme. 
37 Above n 33, 3. 
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advertising. The term "advertising" was defined by the code to encompass the 
promotion of the interests of any person, product or service.
38 The Board's 
jurisdiction was clearly limited to commercial advertising aimed at consumers. 
Since the Commission does not engage in this type of promotion when it 
undertakes public education it therefore fell outside the ambit of the Board's 
jurisdiction. The court declared that, as a matter of interpretation of the 
advertising code, the Board did not have jurisdiction to rule on the Commission's 
public education advertisements. 
It is interesting to note that the court .did not adopt the restrictive governmental 
interest or "but for" tests of amenability to judicial review favoured by the English 
courts. It took a broader, if unarticulated, view of what constitutes a public 
element for the purpose of establishing whether a particular body is subject to 
administrative law principles. The court noted that it would be anomalous to deny 
judicial review in respect of the Board considering that it is constituted under a 
judicially reviewable entity, the Society. This was framed merely as an 
observation. Although the court could have justified its position that the Board is 
subject to review on the basis that it is an integral part of a system of government 
control, or that the government would step in to regulate advertising standards and 
complaints adjudication "but for" the existence of the Board, it steered clear of 
these tests. 
IV SHOULD SELF-REGULATORY BODIES BE JUDICIALLY 
REVIEW ABLE? 
This part of this paper shows that the alternative mechanisms by which self-
regulatory bodies can be held accountable are inadequate. It deals with whether 
judicial review is an appropriate means of filling this accountability vacuum. This 
is assessed in terms of the theoretical and practical implications of extending the 
38 The definition of "advertising" provided in the code has since been broadened to include the 
provision of information for public education. 
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scope of the judiciary's supervisory jurisdiction in this way. 
A Alternative Mechanisms of Accountability 
1 Public law principles 
Self-regulatory bodies may be subject to public law principles in an ostensibly 
private action. Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union
39 is an example 
of a case in which the court examined a private body's decision-making process 
against the principles of good administration outside the context of judicial review 
proceedings. Sir Gordon Borrie has referred to this case as an example of the 
judiciary's private law supervisory or ·"longstop" jurisdiction.
40 In Finnigan, the 
Union's decision to accept an invitation for an All Black team to tour South Africa 
was challenged on the basis of invalidity and illegality. Justice Cooke held that 
the Union had deliberately shut its eyes to public concern over the South African 
I 
tour. In so doing, the court essentially imposed upon the Union the requirement 
to have regard to relevant considerations in its decision-making. Among the 
reasons which the court gave for applying public law standards to the private entity 
was the fact that the Union was making a decision of major national importance. 
Presumably the courts might also expect a self-regulatory body making a decision 
with important implications for the public to observe the principles of good 
administration. 
The principles of natural justice, which form the basis of one of the grounds of 
judicial review, have been applied to entities such as professional bodies and club 
committees outside the context of judicial review proceedings.
41 Self-regulatory 
bodies could be subject to the rules of natural justice even if they were considered 
not to be judicially reviewable. 
39 [1985] 2 NZLR 159. 
40 Sir G Borrie "The Regulation of Public and Private Power" [1989] Public Law 552, 563. 
41 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, 47. 
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2 Abuse of dominant position as a monopoly 
Taggart claims that the doctrine that monopoly suppliers of essential goods must 
supply at a reasonable price is well established as part of New Zealand law.
42 
The Court of Appeal in Auckland Electric Power Board v Electricity Corporation 
of New Zealand commented favourably on the availability of a common law action 
against a monopoly supplier for refusing to supply at fair and reasonable prices. 
43 
The Privy Council hedged its comments about the availability of such an action in 
rather less certain terms in the appeal decision of Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand Ltd.44 If such an action does in fact exist in New 
Zealand, this may provide a mechanism for making self-regulatory bodies 
accountable for the way in which they exercise their powers. 
The common law duty not to abuse a monopoly position is traditionally concerned 
with the reasonableness of the charge for the use of property or the provision of 
related services. Forsyth however, queries why this duty should not apply to those 
who exercise monopoly power in general. 
45 Self-regulatory bodies could be said 
to exert monopoly power when they exercise discretionary power conferred upon 
them by contract or consent, particularly when exercised in such a way as to affect 
third parties. Forsyth proposes that the common law could impose upon such 
bodies a requirement to act reasonably and in accordance with the rules of natural 
justice.46 The development of such an action could have the effect of subjecting 
self-regulatory bodies to the same standards of decision-making as those applied 
in judicial review. Forsyth describes this recognition of the common law's ability 
to control monopoly power as a basis for extending the scope of judicial review 
to these bodies. 
42 M Taggart, above n 23, 362. 
43 [1994] 1 NZLR 551, 557. 
44 Above n 22, 391. 
45 C Forsyth "Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of 
Parliament and Judicial Review" (1996) 55 Cambridge Law Journal 122, 125. 
46 Above n 45, 125. 
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3 Competition Law 
Like all private entities, self-regulatory bodies are subject to competition law. 
Section 27(1) of the Commerce Act 1986 provides: 
No person shall enter into a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an 
understanding, containing a provision that bas the purpose, or bas the likely 
effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market. 
Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 provides: 
No person who bas a dominant position in a market shall use that position for the 
purpose of-
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; 
or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive 
conduct in that or in any other market; or 
(c) Eliminating any person from that or in any other market. 
These sections could be invoked in relation to self-regulatory bodies in some 
instances. The Ministry of Consumer Affairs in its policy paper on self-regulation 
and codes of practice recognised that industries may use self-regulatory schemes 
as a means of restricting competition by limiting entry to participation in the 
scheme or setting unnecessarily high minimum standards of trading conduct.
47 As 
a further example of how a self-regulatory body might contravene the above 
competition law provisions, the Advertising Standards Complaints Board may be 
said to prevent a person from engaging in competitive conduct by upholding an 
unfounded complaint about that person's advertisement and preventing it from 
being published in future. The Court of Appeal in Cameron noted that the 
Commerce Commission had in fact considered the collective activities of the Board 
on competition law grounds and raised no objection. The court presumed that this 
47 Above n 2, 8. 
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was because the Society and the Board are regarded as operating in the public 
interest.48 Under section 35 of the Commerce Act 1986, the Commerce 
Commission may authorise a code which infringes the above competition 
provisions if it is satisfied that the code will result in a benefit to the public which 
will outweigh any restrictive effect on competition. 
The Commerce Commission's power to control the unreasonable exercise of power 
is limited to those situations where competition is thereby inhibited or the public 
is mislead or deceived. Competition law therefore has only limited value as a 
mechanism of accountability in relation to self-regulatory bodies. 
49 
4 Contract Law 
Members of self-regulatory bodies are often in contractual relationships with each 
other and with the body itself. They are contractually bound to submit to the 
body's jurisdiction. It would be inconsistent with the freedom of contract to deny 
that such an agreement is legally binding. However there cannot be an absolute 
obligation to submit to the body's discretionary exercise of power. The courts, in 
some cases, perform private law supervision by implying terms such as natural 
justice50 and fairness into contracts.
51 These standards reflect some of the 
principles of good administration which are applied in judicial review.
52 
Similarly, the contract between the participating banks and the Banking 
Ombudsman could be said to contain an implied term that the Banking 
48 Above n 33, 3. 
49 Taggart recognised the limited extent to which competition law may be invoked to control the 
unreasonable exercise of private power in M Taggart "Corporatisation, Privatisation and Public
 
Law" (1991) 2 Public Law Review 77, 96. 
50 There may be an express term that the rules of natural justice will be observed in the complaints 
handling and enforcement procedures of a self-regulatory body, as recommended by the Ministry
 
of Consumer Affairs. See Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 5, 11-12. 
51 See for example Marlborough Harbour Board v Goulden [1985] 2 NZLR 378, 383; above n 29, 
566. 
52 D Oliver "Is the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis of Judicial Review?" [1987) Public Law 543, 558-
560; M Taggart "The Impact of Corporatisation and Privatisation on Administrative Law" (1992)
 
51 Australian Journal of Public Administration 368, 369. 
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Ombudsman would exercise her powers reasonably. The parties could surely not 
have intended otherwise. The courts would allow the Ombudsman a high degree 
of discretion in determining whether a particular decision was made reasonably, 
given her expertise in handling banking complaints. The courts' inquiry would 
then closely resemble that engaged in under the irrationality or Wednesbury 
unreasonableness head of judicial review. 
A member of a self-regulatory body may bring an action in respect of a breach of 
an express term in its contract with the body. For example, clause 16 of the 
Banking Ombudsman's Terms of Reference provides that:
53 
In making any recommendation or award under these Terms of Reference the 
Banking Ombudsman shall ... have regard to the general principles of good 
banking practice and any relevant code of practice applicable to the subject matter 
of the complaint. 
If the Banking Ombudsman were to make an award against a participating bank in 
respect of a complaint without referring to the Code of Banking Practice, in a 
situation where this code is relevant, the participating bank could presumably bring 
an action against the Ombudsman for breach of contract. The Banking 
Ombudsman would not have exercised her discretionary power in accordance with 
her contractual obligations. To determine whether the Ombudsman breached the 
contractual term in such a scenario, the court would need to engage in an inquiry 
which would mirror judicial review. The "relevant code of practice" referred to 
in clause 16 above is the equivalent of a statutorily prescribed mandatory relevant 
consideration. The inquiry into whether this was considered would be the same, 
whether to establish breach of contract or illegality in the public law sense. These 
example illustrate Cane's contention that the differences between public law and 
contractual controls on the exercise of discretionary power are very unclear. 
54 
53 Office of the Banking Ombudsman The Banking Ombudsman: Tenns of Reference (Wellington, 
1996) 8. 
54 Above n 21, 339. 
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The utility of contract law as an alternative to judicial review as a means of 
providing redress for the unjust exercise of discretionary power by self-regulatory 
bodies is very limited. The doctrine of privity of contract makes contractual 
claims unavailable to third parties to a contract. The Electoral Commission in 
Cameron could not have relied on a claim in contract to seek redress against the 
Advertising Standards Complaints Board, for example, because it was not in a 
contractual relationship with the Board. 
B Theoretical Basis of Judicial Review 
Whether self-regulatory bodies should be subject to judicial review depends, in 
part, on whether this extension of the courts' supervisory jurisdiction would be 
consistent with its theoretical underpinnings. An ad hoe extension of the scope of 
judicial review to these bodies could be challenged as unconstitutional and 
illegitimate. This section outlines the development of the traditional scope of 
judicial review. The relevance of the ultra vires conception of judicial review is 
dismissed and an alternative theory of the basis of the judicial review jurisdiction 
is postulated. The role of the judiciary in defining the scope of its review 
jurisdiction is examined. The last point dealt with in this section is the conceptual 
coherence of subjecting self-regulatory bodies to judicial review. 
1 Development of judicial review· 
The origins of judicial review are complex. Early judicial review was principally 
a mechanism by which the Kings Bench exerted its dominance over inferior 
tribunals. It provided a means of remedying unjust or illegal treatment by these 
tribunals. The nineteenth century saw a gradual transformation in the rationale for 
judicial review. The exercise of judicial power came to be expressed as a means 
of enforcing the will of a representative legislature. The ultra vires principle was 
developed as the doctrinal justification for judicial intervention into the exercise 
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of power delegated to government agencies by Parliament.
55 
More recently, the predominant concern of judicial review has been to protect the 
citizenry from the excesses of executive power. The courts have developed the 
principles of this branch of administrative law largely since World War II. This 
has been in response to the expansion in the Crown's activities since that period 
and the decreasing ability of Parliament to control the executive branch of 
government. 56 Some might say that the scope of judicial review should therefore 
now be shrinking as the state retreats. 57 
The courts maintain that judicial review is a jurisdictional inquiry, not an appeal 
or a rehearing. This is reflected in the standards applied in judicial review, which 
have come to be known as "the principles of good administration". These rules 
constitute the grounds upon which specific acts and decisions may be challenged 
in judicial review proceedings. They include illegality, irrationality (also known 
as Wednesbury unreasonableness), breach of natural justice and various emerging 
grounds of review. These grounds ostensibly relate to the integrity of the 
decision-making process, rather than to the correctness of the decision itself. 
Critics suggest that the judicial inquiry is in fact becoming increasingly concerned 
with the substance of decisions and that this is inappropriate. 
58 
2 Basis of judicial review jurisdiction 
(a) Ultra Vires 
The orthodox conceptual basis of judicial review is ultra vires. Oliver defines this 
doctrine in terms of its two limbs. First, it means that a public authority may only 
ss PP Craig Administrative Law (3 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) 5-6 . 
.56 G Taylor, above n 23, 4; AR Galbraith "Deregulation, Privatisation and Corporatisation of 
Crown Activity: How will the Law Respond?" (New Zealand Law Conference: The Law and 
Politics, Wellington, March 1993) 226, 227. 
s7 Sir Ivor Richardson, in Taggart's opinion, subscribes to this point of view. See M Taggart, 
above n 23, 360-361. 
58 See for example M Poole "Legitimate Expectation and Substantive Fairness: Beyond the Limits 
of Procedural Propriety" [1995] New Zealand Law Review 426. 
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act within the legal powers directly or indirectly delegated to it by Parliament. 
Conversely, it is compelled to act where Parliament has charged it with a legal 
responsibility to do so. Public authorities must exercise their powers in 
accordance with the principles of good administration in order to comply with the 
second limb of the doctrine. 59 Parliament is presumed to intend these restraints 
on the exercise of power by public authorities and further, is presumed to intend 
the courts to exercise the supervisory jurisdiction of judicial review in relation to 
the exercise of such power. 60 According to the traditional view, the legitimacy 
of the courts' supervisory jurisdiction rests on the doctrine of ultra vires since 
there is otherwise no constitutional basis for the courts to interfere with the 
exercise of statutory power. 
Judicial review of self-regulatory bodies is unjustified under the ultra vires 
conception of the courts' supervisory jurisdiction. Since the codes of practice 
according to which these entities operate have not been generated or even 
sanctioned by Parliament, it cannot be said that Parliament has expressed any 
intention in relation to how the discretionary powers they confer should be 
exercised. The courts cannot cite Parliament's intention as a basis for their 
supervisory jurisdiction in relation to self-regulatory bodies. However, this 
difficulty is not fatal to the legitimacy of judicial review of self-regulatory bodies. 
Although Sir William Wade describes the ultra vires doctrine as the "central 
principle of administrative law", 61 many other commentators have rejected this 
conception of the theoretical basis of judicial review as artificial.62 For example, 
it does not explain the extension of the courts' supervisory jurisdiction to the 
exercise of prerogative power63 in Council of Civil Service Unions. 64 If the 
source of power being reviewed is non-statutory, then Parliament has not 
59 D Oliver, above n 52, 544. 
ro Sir W Wade and C Forsyth Administrative Law (7 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) 43. 
61 Above n 60, 41. 
62 See for example D Oliver, above n 52; Lord Woolf "Droit Public - English Style" [1995) Public 
Law 57, 65-66; above n 45, 122. 
6.J D Oliver, above n 52, 546; above n 45, 123; S De Smith, H Woolf and J Jowell Judicial Review 
of Administrative Action (5 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995) 250-251. 
64 Above n 11. 
23 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY Ofi WEL.L.IN<.TON 
expressed any intention in relation to how it should be exercised and the ultra vires 
principle fails to justify judicial intervention. 
Sir William himself has betrayed his loyalty to the ultra vires basis of judicial 
review in proposing that judicial review ought to lie against a private body where 
livelihood or property are at stake. 
65 It is difficult to see how Sir William could 
justify judicial review of private entities considering his view of the ultra vires 
doctrine as the central principle of administrative law. 
(b) Protect individuals 
What is the basis of the judiciary's judicial review powers if it is not ultra vires? 
Joseph has observed that courts are claiming a general power to remedy injustices 
rather than indulging in jurisdictional terminology.
66 Oliver suggests that the 
legitimacy of judicial review now rests on a concern for the protection of 
individuals. Judicial review is inherently legitimate since it is a means of 
controlling power and it is necessary to control the exercise of power in order to 
protect individuals. 67 Sir Harry Woolf (as he then was) has taken a similar 
position, suggesting that "a body should be subject to judicial review if it exercises 
authority over another person or body in such a manner as to cause material 
prejudice to that person or body ... ". 
68 Taylor suggests that those bodies with 
"the practical power to determine or affect the rights, broadly speaking, of persons 
who have not voluntarily consented to that. .. " be subject to review.
69 
The notion that judicial review is legitimate because it protects individuals from 
the abuse of power is extremely broad. It does not explain why the courts should 
apply administrative law standards, as opposed to principles of private law, to a 
particular discretionary exercise of power. The hypothesis assumes that judicial 
65 Sir W Wade "New Horizons in Administrative Law" (9th Commonwealth Law Con
ference, 
Auckland, April 1990) 437, 441. 
66 P Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New 'Zealand (The Law Book Co,
 Sydney, 
1993) 661-662. 
61 D Oliver, above n 52, 543. 
68 Sir H Woolf "Judicial Review: A Possible Programme for Reform" (1992] Public Law 
221, 235. 
69 G Taylor, above n 23, 16. 
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review is concerned principally with providing a means of redress for individuals 
who have been aggrieved by the unjust exercise of power. It fails to address the 
equally important role of modem judicial review, which is to improve the quality 
of administrative decision-making.70 
(c) Uphold public expectations 
There is a growing expectation that those who wield power in society should be 
accountable71 and subject to the principles of "liberty, fair dealing and good 
administration". 72 While this trend could be used to justify an expansion in the 
scope of judicial review, it does not provide a clear basis on which to define its 
limits. Public expectation is too vague a concept to explain why some forms of 
power should be subject to private law standards of behaviour and other forms 
should be controlled by the more onerous public law principles. 
Public expectations of accountability in relation to particular organisations probably 
depend more on the power of the organisation to affect their interests than on the 
source of the power. This points in favour of a functional rather than source-based 
approach to defining the scope of judicial review. 
(d) Control market power 
Taggart believes the appropriate scope of judicial review to include the exercise 
of significant market power by privatised enterprises and private corporations. 
73 
Oliver74 and Sir Gordon Borrie75 share this view. This proposed extension of 
the scope of judicial review is not based on constitutionally sound principles. The 
ad hoe imposition of public law standards on decision-makers simply on the basis 
10 GDS Taylor "May Judicial Review become a Backwater?" in M Taggart (ed) Judicial Review 
of Administrative Action in the 1980s (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1986) 153, 177. 
71 M Chen "Judicial Review of State-Owned Enterprises at the Cross-Roads" (1994) 24 Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review 51 , 68; M Chen "The Reconfiguration of the State and the 
Appropriate Scope of Judicial Review" in J Boston (ed) The State under Contract (Bridget Williams 
Books Ltd, Wellington, 1995) 121. 
72 Above n 40, 558-559. 
73 M Taggart, above n 52, 371. 
74 D Oliver, above n 52, 566. 
75 Above n 40, 554. 
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that they wield significant power in the market is unjustified. If a large 
corporation decides to source its raw materials from an alternative supplier, 
thereby causing the existing supplier to go out of business, it would be absurd to 
suggest that the aggrieved supplier could challenge the decision in judicial review 
proceedings on the basis that it was made irrationally for example. This degree 
of judicial interference would stifle the flexibility which market players must have 
to operate successfully in a competitive commercial environment. The certainty 
required to promote commercial activity would be undermined by judicial review 
or even by the threat of such review. It would pose too great a restriction on the 
individual liberties of the private entities. Their participation in the market could 
be discouraged by onerous standards of decision-making. The public interest 
would not be served by making private entities subject to judicial review simply 
on the basis that they exercise significant power in the market. 
(e) Control exercise of public power 
A number of commentators agree that the susceptibility of an entity to judicial 
review should be determined on the basis of the nature of the function it 
performs. 76 The use of the public function test as an indicator of the applicability 
of public law standards and sanctions is seen in the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 ("the NZBORA"). Section 3(b) makes the rights and freedoms contained 
in the Act applicable to acts done "[b]y any person or body in the performance of 
any public function, power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body 
pursuant to law". This test recognises that bodies which exercise public functions 
should be subject to public law standards and sanctions to secure the public 
interest, irrespective of whether these bodies are public or private. 
Commentators who believe that the performance of a public function should be 
subject to judicial review implicitly reject the notion that judicial review is limited 
to the control of power derived from a particular source. However, their 
conceptions of the type of function which should render a body subject to judicial 
76 G Taylor and J Timmins • Administrative Law - The Changed Role of the Government" (New 
Zealand Law Society Seminar, Wellington, August 1989) 1, 25; J Black, above n 10, 43. 
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review are many and varied. A public function or element is said to be required, 
but what is the meaning of "public"? Tompkins' suggestion that the word in this 
context simply means "affecting subjects"
77 is too broad to provide a sound basis 
upon which to apply public law principles. Many large corporations, for example, 
have the power to affect a significant portion of the general public. Holding these 
entities to public law standards of decision-making is undesirable, as previously 
explained. 
It is proposed in this paper that public power is that which is purportedly exercised 
in the "public interest", and that this is the key to the theoretical basis of judicial 
review.78 The courts' power to judicially review governmental bodies arises not 
from the ultra vires doctrine, but from the fact that these entities exist to serve the 
public interest. Bodies purporting to serve the best interests of the pubic should 
be held to higher standards of decision-making than those operating to maximise 
their own benefits. The public has an interest in holding these entities to 
particularly high standards of decision-making. The law need not be so concerned 
with respecting the individual liberties of bodies who are self-professedly operating 
in the public interest. This proposed justification for judicial imposition of the 
principles of good administration provides a coherent basis on which to extend the 
scope of judicial review beyond executive power to power wielded by private 
entities, including self-regulatory bodies. 
In the heavily regulated economy which characterised the period between World 
War II and the 1980s, the only entities which operated in the public interest were 
governmental in nature. In the deregulated economic and social climate of the past 
decade, we have seen public interest as a primary focus in private entities such as 
n AIM Tompkins "Judicial Review and the Public Domain" [1987] New Zealand Law Journal 120, 
122. 
78 See J Fogarty "Legal Accountability of Government in all its Guises: Where to After Mercury?" 
in J Fogarty and E Wylie (eds) Hot Topics in Administrative and Public Law New Zealand Law 
Society Seminar, Wellington, May 1995, l; S de Smith, H Woolf and J Jowell, above n 63, 167-
168. 
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State-Owned Enterprises
79 ("SOEs") as well as in self-regulatory bodies. Indeed, 
the Privy Council in Mercury Energy Ltd gave the fact that SOEs operate in the 
public interest as one of the reasons for holding them to be amenable to judicial 
review. 80 Public interest decision-making has moved into the private sector. The 
courts should recognise this and extend the scope of judicial review accordingly. 
(I) New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
A statutory imperative to subject self-regulatory bodies to judicial review would 
provide a constitutionally sound basis for extending the judiciary's review 
jurisdiction to these bodies. The NZBORA provides that judicial review is 
available in respect of some entities. However, whether self-regulatory bodies are 
among these entities is debatable. 
Section 3(b) of the NZBORA provides that its rights and freedoms apply to acts 
done "[b]y any person or body in the performance of any public function, power 
or duty conferred or imposed on the person or body by or pursuant to law". 
Whether self-regulatory bodies fall within section 3(b) depends on whether the 
courts consider these bodies to perform a "public function" and whether the power 
to perform this function is conferred by law. NZBORA jurisprudence as it has 
developed to date indicates that the courts will take a generous and purposive 
approach to the interpretation of section 3(b).
81 
The courts have not yet had to decide whether self-regulatory bodies perform a 
public function for the purposes of the NZBORA. Justice McGechan in the High 
Court decision of Federated Farmers of New Zealand (lnc) v New Zealand Post 
Ltd attached some importance to the fact that New Zealand Post's power to 
exercise its mail handling function was originally conferred by statute in holding 
79 SOEs are private in the sense that they are incorporated under the Companies Act 1993. The 
powers they exercise derive from this general legislation, not from specific empowering statutes
. 
Of course they are public bodies in the sense that they are owned by the public. 
80 Above n 22, 388. 
81 Noort v Ministry of Transport; Curran v Police (1990-92) 1 NZBORR 97, 163 (per Hardie Boys 
J). 
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that it was a public function for the purpose of section 3(b). The other relevant 
factors were that New Zealand Post, although an incorporated company, is 
ultimately owned and controlled by the Crown, and that mail handling is carried 
out in the public interest. 82 The fact that self-regulatory bodies operate (or at 
least purport to operate) in the public interest is the only one of these factors which 
applies to these entities. A court may be persuaded to hold that they perform a 
public function for the purposes of section 3(b) by the fact that the function of self-
regulatory bodies would, in some cases, be performed by statutory bodies but for 
their existence. 
Some commentators, including Taggart, take the view that "law" does not refer 
exclusively to statute law and includes common law.
83 A self-regulatory body's 
exercise of power derived from the common law of contract may therefore be 
subject to the rights and freedoms contained in the NZBORA. 
Section 27(2) of the NZBORA provides that: 
Every person whose rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by 
law have been affected by a determination of any tribunal or other public 
authority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, for judicial review of 
that determination. 
An applicant seeking judicial review on the basis of this section would need to 
show that the self-regulatory body in question is a public authority. Whether this 
would automatically follow from a finding that the body performs a public 
function, which is a prerequisite for the applicability of the NZBORA to a private 
entity, is unclear. Chen takes the view that public authorities are arguably subsets 
of the bodies included in section 3(b) of the NZBORA.
84 According to the White 
Paper on the NZBORA, the meanings of "public authority" and "determination" 
82 (1992) 3 NZBORR 339, 394. 
83 M Taggart, above n 23, 362; P Radich and R Best "Section 3 of the Bill of Rights" [1997] New 
Zealand Law Journal 251, 255. 
114 M Chen, 1994, above n 71, 84. 
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were deliberately left vague. 
85 (There is no relevant case law deriving from the 
Canadian Charter since it does not include an equivalent to section 27(2).) The 
onus was intentionally put onto the courts to define these terms and thereby draw 
the line as to which bodies and which types of decisions should be subject to 
judicial review. 
It seems clear that whether the NZBORA confers a right on an individual 
aggrieved by the decision of a self-regulatory body to bring judicial review 
proceedings against that body would depend on the existence of a public 
element. 86 The court would therefore need to engage in the same inquiry as that 
required to determine the availability of judicial review at common law or under 
the JAA. As Radich and Best point out, the respective scopes of judicial review 
and the NZBORA probably coincide to a great extent. 
87 The NZBORA does not, 
therefore, provide an alternative basis on which to justify judicial review of self-
regulatory bodies. 
3 Judiciary 's role in defining thi scope of judicial review 
As explained in part III B 1 above, the scope of judicial review is not prescribed 
by the JAA. This Act is merely a procedural tool to streamline judicial review 
applications. As a creature of the common law the scope of judicial review is 
entirely at the discretion of the judiciary, 
88 at least in the absence of legislative 
intervention. The judiciary's power to define the scope of judicial review is 
therefore unencumbered by the statutory wording of the JAA. 
The legitimacy of judicial review depends ultimately on public confidence. 
89 One 
conception of the courts' role is that it should translate the public's expectations 
85 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985) 110. 
86 The White Paper was clear that the proposed Bill of Rights was not intended to apply to private 
action. Above n 85, 71. 
87 P Radich and R Best, above n 83, 255. 
88 Burt v Governor-General (1992) 3 NZLR 673, 683. 
89 Sir G Brennan "The Purpose and Scope of Judicial Review" in M Taggart (ed) Judicial Review 
of Administrative Action in the 1980s (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1986) 18; AR Galbraith, 
above n 56, 227. 
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into legal principles in order to maintain this confidence. This has been expre
ssed 
by Thomas J as "judicial autonomy", which he defines as:
90 
... the process by which a judge translates the standards, needs and expectatio
ns 
of the community into legal principles, and it incorporates the freedo
m, 
independence, and capacity for judges to consciously undertake that task. 
He argues that a duty to exercise this autonomy arises because the law exist
s "to 
serve the community and meet the function which society has ascribed to 
it". 91 
Taylor agrees that the principles of judicial review are based on a jud
icial 
assessment of what society requires. The courts mould their jurisdiction accor
ding 
to the will of the public. 
92 It would be far-fetched to suggest that the courts 
could elucidate the prevailing public expectation in relation to which type
s of 
entities should be held to public law as opposed to private law standard
s of 
behaviour. The public's expectation of accountability could motivate the judic
iary 
to expand the scope of judicial review. It could not, however, define
 the 
appropriate scope of the judiciary's public law supervisory jurisdiction. The co
urts 
must take a more active role in circumscribing the scope of review than m
erely 
translating public sentiment into legal principles. 
Sir Ivor Richardson believes that the courts must be continually alert to
 the 
changing context of the law in society:
93 
[T]he values underlying particular legal principles need to be continua
lly 
reassessed, modified, and in some cases replaced, to reflect contempor
ary 
thinking. This need to re-examine is particularly true where society has go
ne 
through or is going through a marked change. And to function effectively cou
rts 
cannot afford to be too far ahead or too far behind in their thinking. 
90 Justice EW Thomas "A Return to Principle in Judicial Reasoning and an Acclamation of Judicial 
Autonomy" (1993) 23 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review I, 2. 
91 Above n 90, 2. 
92 G Taylor, above n 23, 3. 
93 Above n 4, 64. 
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It is the courts' role to continually reassess the basis of judicial review and the 
extent of its legitimate scope. It is incumbent on the courts to identify the types 
of power which should be subject to its judicial review oversight. The courts 
should clearly articulate the basis upon which particular powers are subjected to 
public law principles. 
4 Conceptual coherence 
Sir William Wade believes that the application of judicial review to a self-
regulatory body's code of practice has curious constitutional consequences. In 
conducting judicial review of a self-regulatory body's acts and decisions, the 
courts, according to Sir William, would be treating the code as a form of 
legislation. Sir William perceives there to be a constitutional difficulty here in that 
this "legislation" has been generated independently of Parliament. 
94 It is difficult 
to see the relevance of this theoretical argument since the application of judicial 
review to self-regulatory bodies does not threaten parliamentary sovereignty. Sir 
William, it seems, subscribes to the unitary vision of democracy, where all public 
power is legitimated by MPs in Parliament. Subjecting private entities to judicial 
review is not conceptually incoherent under the pluralist democratic model, under 
which power can be legitimated in other ways. The Diceyan notion that all public 
power must be channelled through Parliament is no longer appropriate considering 
the many and diverse concentrations of power in modem society. 
Sir William also points to the absurdity of suggesting that a decision of a self-
regulatory body could be quashed. Quashing normally renders a decision without 
legal effect, but the decision of a self-regulatory body is of no legal effect in any 
case. Sir William concludes that it would therefore be meaningless to quash such 
a decision. 95 Again, this can be dismissed as a purely semantic argument. 
Quashing a decision of a private body would have a symbolic value and, in some 
94 Above n 65, 439. See also PY Baker "New Vistas of Judicial Review" (1987) 103 The Law 
Quarterly Review 323, 326. 
95 Above n 65, 437. 
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cases, a practical effect. It would not, contrary to Sir William's contention, be 
meaningless. 
C The Distinction between Public and Private Law 
It would be undesirable to make particular entities subject to public law principles 
on an ad hoe basis. This would introduce uncertainty and would undermine the 
legitimacy of judicial review. Making self-regulatory bodies susceptible to judicial 
review could be said to blur the notional boundary between public and private law, 
since a private body would be subjected to public law standards of good 
administration and could be exposed to public law sanctions. This concern would 
be valid if the source of power were the determinant of whether public or private 
law should apply. However, it has already been proposed that the essence of the 
distinction between public and private law is that public law applies to power 
which is exercised, or is purported to be exercised, in the public interest. Since 
self-regulatory bodies by their nature operate in the public interest, they may be 
subjected to judicial review without compromising the distinction between public 
and private law. 
Lord Cooke has played down the significance of the distinction between public and 
private law in a number of contexts. In Finnigan Cooke J (as he then was) 
described the situation as falling "into a special area where, in the New Zealand 
context, a sharp boundary between public and private law cannot realistically be 
drawn". 96 In another instance, he described it as strained to treat public and 
private law as separate systems in New Zealand. He considered that the 1977 
amendment to the JAA including powers conferred under the constitution of a body 
corporate in the range of powers which could be reviewed blurred the boundary 
between the two systems. 97 Sir William Wade has referred to the distinction 
96 Above n 39, 179. 
rn Sir R Cooke "The Struggle for Simplicity" in M Taggart (ed) Judicial Review of Administrative
 
Action in the 1980s (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1986) 1, 3. 
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between public and private law as misguided. 98 
Lord Woolf, contrary to Lord Cooke and Sir William, maintains that the 
distinction between public and private law remains an important one. He claims 
that the imposition of the higher standards of decision-making imposed by public 
compared to private law is justified in relation to bodies operating in the public 
interest. However, the standards of good administration are too onerous to impose 
on private entities who operate, as they are entitled to, in their own best 
interests. 99 Subjecting private bodies ·exercising a public function to public law 
standards does not compromise the distinction between public and private law. 
Rather, it recognises that public power may be exercised privately. 
D Effects of Extending Judicial Review to Self-Regulatory Bodies 
1 Floodgates 
Some critics of an expanded scope of judicial review cite a floodgates argument, 
predicting that the courts would be overwhelmed with applications for review. 
100 
This is not a legitimate basis on which to determine the scope of judicial review. 
If it were, the Executive could manipulate the scope of the judiciary's supervisory 
jurisdiction by neglecting to fill judicial vacancies. 
101 Restricting the scope of 
judicial review to avoid flooding the courts with applications wrongly elevates the 
scarcity of resources to a legal principle. 
102 Pannick agrees that the courts 
should not be tempted to place fetters on their jurisdiction by the lack of judicial 
resources. 103 
98 Above n 60, 667. 
99 Lord Woolf, above n 62, 61. 
100 J Black, above n 10, 31. 
101 S de Smith, H Woolf and J Jowell, above n 63, 172. 
102 E Barendt, A Barron, J Herberg and J Jowell "Annual Review - Public Law" (1993) 46 Current 
Legal Problems 103, 116. 
103 D Pannick "Who is Subject to Judicial Review and in Respect of What?" [1992) Public Law 1, 
7. 
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The floodgates argument is also undermined by the mechanisms of controlling 
unmeritorious claims which the courts have at their disposal. Judicial review can 
be denied if the court considers that the subject-matter is not suitable for judicial 
consideration, or is non-justiciable. 104 The discretionary nature of the public law 
remedies provides the courts with an important control mechanism. 105 
2 Uncenainty 
Sir William Wade has expressed concern about the uncertainty which might result 
from enlarging the scope of judicial review:106 
I cannot help feeling that administrative law should be about law, and should 
confine itself to powers and duties which are genuinely based on statutory or 
other legal foundations. Once the courts go beyond what is genuinely law, what 
guidelines will there be for them - and for the citizen who needs to know where 
he stands? 
A broadening in the scope of judicial review can only introduce uncertainty as to 
its limits if it is broadened on an unarticulated and ad hoe basis. This, arguably, 
is the situation at present. The notion of a "public function" is insufficiently 
defined to clearly circumscribe the scope of review in relation to private entities. 
Legal certainty can, however, be improved if the courts devise a coherent basis for 
the scope of judicial review and clearly articulate this when determining whether 
to subject a particular entity to public law principles. The public interest test 
would circumscribe the scope of judicial review quite clearly. Sir William's 
assumption that an enlarged scope of judicial review is inherently uncertain is 
flawed. 
104 G Taylor, above n 23, 18. 
105 G Taylor, above n 23, 52. 
106 Above n 65, 440. 
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3 Frustrate advantages of self-regulation 
Sir William Wade has claimed that judicial review of self-regulatory bodies 
frustrates the advantages of self-regulation by introducing legal arguments and 
contests and associated formality, hostility, delay and expense. 107 The English 
Insurance Ombudsman has similar concerns about the impact of judicial review. 
He is said to have expressed relief after the Aegon Life Assurance Ltd decision, in 
which his acts and decisions were held not to be subject to judicial review. He 
believed that susceptibility to judicial review would hinder the flexibility of his 
office and would force him to become unnecessarily formal and legalistic in its 
procedures. 108 
It may be argued that these concerns about the effects of judicial review are 
unjustified considering that these bodies need do no more than adhere to the 
principles of good administration to avoid having their acts and decisions 
successfully challenged in judicial review proceedings. The force of this argument 
depends on what is meant by the "principles of good administration" as applied to 
self-regulatory bodies. Over-zealous application of public law principles would 
undoubtedly frustrate some of the advantages of self-regulation. A strict 
application of the judicial review ground of illegality for example, would force 
self-regulatory bodies to take a legalistic approach to the interpretation of their 
codes of practice. This could undermine their flexibility to act according to the 
spirit of the code and treat each new situation according to its merits. This is 
further discussed in part VI below. . The courts may also limit the impact of 
judicial review on self-regulatory bodies by exercising their discretion in relation 
to judicial review remedies. This is discussed in part VII below. 
107 Above n 65, 438. 
108 PE Morris "The Insurance Ombudsman Bureau and Judicial Review" (1994] Lloyd's Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly 358, 360. 
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4 Legitimation 
The availability of judicial review of decisions of a self-regulatory body enhances 
its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 109 Self-regulatory bodies are subject to 
the criticism that they are biased toward the industry in which they operate. 
Judicial review would help to dispel this criticism. They would be seen to be 
accountable, both by the public and by the member organisations. 
V STANDING TO BRING ACTIONS AGAINST SELF-REGULATORY 
BODIES 
The JAA imposes no specific requirements as to standing. The only standing 
requirements in relation to judicial review of self-regulatory bodies should be that 
the applicant's rights or interests have been affected by the act or decision of such 
a body. This indeed seems to be the line taken by the Court of Appeal in 
Cameron when it indicated that the Electoral Commission could conceivably bring 
judicial review proceedings against the Advertising Standards Complaints Board 
in the future. It seems that Taylor was unduly conservative in his approach to 
standing: 110 
[T]he actions of a private law organisation may be challenged by members, those 
for whose benefit the organisation exists and those voluntarily bringing themselves 
within the organisation's jurisdiction. Total strangers adversely affected by the 
unlawful actions of [a private] organisation could bring proceedings in tort or 
contract as in any private law dispute - the proceedings would not have a judicial 
review nature. 
Perhaps Taylor's approach can in fact be reconciled with the broader view of 
standing in relation to self-regulatory bodies since these organisations operate in 
109 Glen Wiggs, Executive Director, Advertising Standards Complaints Board, telephone interview, 
9 July 1997. 
110 G Taylor,above n 23, 14. 
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the public interest. Since they exist for everyone's benefit, anyone who has been 
aggrieved by such a body potentially has standing to bring actions against them. 
There are no "total strangers" to self-regulatory bodies. 
While it seems clear that aggrieved third parties should have standing to bring 
judicial review actions against self-regulatory bodies, the question remains whether 
a member organisation in a contractual relationship with such a body should be 
allowed to initiate judicial review proceedings. There is an analogy between the 
issue of whether an applicant who has submitted to the jurisdiction of a self-
regulatory body should have recourse to judicial review, and the issue of whether 
a plaintiff with a contractual claim may seek a remedy in tort. The general 
position is that there is no concurrent contract and tort liability. This is because 
recourse in tort would frustrate the parties' intention as embodied in their contract. 
Freedom of contract would be impinged upon to an unacceptable extent. 
Similarly, an aggrieved party in a contractual relationship with a self-regulatory 
body should not be able to seek judicial review of the body's decisions. If the 
parties want access to formal mechanisms of dispute resolution in relation to the 
exercise of contractually conferred regulatory power, then they should provide for 
this in their agreement. Thus the position taken in England and New Zealand that 
contractual submission to a self-regulatory body's jurisdiction precludes judicial 
review is based on sound policy considerations since parties are free to provide for 
arbitration or mediation should a dispute arise. In any case, the standards of 
decision-making imposed by the express and implied terms of contracts conferring 
regulatory power are not likely to be very different from those embodied in public 
law principles. See part IV A 4 above. 
Consent to jurisdiction should not deprive an aggrieved individual of standing if 
the self-regulatory body holds a monopoly. The monopoly would vitiate 
meaningful consent to its jurisdiction and judicial review should be available in 
respect of its acts and decisions. 
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VII GROUNDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SELF-REGULATORY 
BODIES 
A Traditional Grounds of Review· 
The JAA does not prescribe the grounds upon which the courts may conduct 
judicial review but implicitly adopts the common law grounds in section 4 which 
states that: 
The High Court may ... by order grant...any relief that the applicant would be 
entitled to in any or more of the proceedings for a writ or order in the nature of 
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari or for a declaration or injunction against that 
person in any such proceedings. 
Thus the traditional grounds of judicial review as articulated in the famous case of 
Council of Civil Service Unions apply in judicial review proceedings under the 
J AA and at common law. Lord Diplock listed them as illegality, irrationality and 
procedural impropriety. He left open the possibility that the list might be extended 
and identified proportionality as a possible ground to be developed in future. 111 
A number of additional grounds including substantive unfaimess112 have emerged 
since this case. 
B Relevance of Traditional Grounds of Review 
Taylor takes the view that judicial review of private organisations would be largely 
on the same grounds as those applied to governmental bodies. 113 This section 
of this paper considers whether Taylor's opinion is supported by the case law and 
explores the question of whether review on this basis would be desirable. 
111 Above n 11, 376-377. 
112 See Thames Valley Electric Power Board v New 'Zealand Pulp and Paper Ltd (1994] 2 NZLR 
641, 652. 
113 G Taylor, above n 23, 15. 
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The traditional grounds of judicial review have developed in the context of the 
exercise of statutory powers. Some of the grounds are more readily applicable to 
the exercise of non-statutory powers than others. If self-regulatory bodies are to 
be judicially reviewable in principle, it is important to consider the grounds on 
which such review should be conducted. 
There is already a willingness to tailor the grounds of judicial review according 
to the particular characteristics of the powers being reviewed. For example, the 
Privy Council in Mercury Energy Ltd significantly restricted the grounds of judicial 
review of commercial decisions of State-Owned Enterprises. Such decisions could 
only be challenged on the basis of fraud, corruption or bad faith. 114 Similarly, 
Wheeler has advocated a flexible approach to judicial review of prerogative 
power.11s 
Lord Donaldson MR expressed concern about the relevance of the traditional 
grounds of review to self-regulatory bodies in the English Court of Appeal 
decision of R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Guinness Pie. He 
proposed an innominate "blanket" ground of review: 116 
It may be that the true view is that, in the context of a body whose constitution, 
functions and powers are sui generis, the court should review the panel's acts and 
omissions more in the round than might otherwise be the case, and whilst basing 
its decision on familiar concepts, should eschew any formal categorisation ... [T]he 
ultimate question would, as always, be whether something has gone wrong of a 
nature and degree which required the intervention of the court ... 
Lord Woolf, in the same case, also advocated this very broad ground of judicial 
review of the Panel, explaining that: 117 
114 Above n 22, 391. 
115 F Wheeler "Judicial Review of Prerogative Power" (1992) 14 Sydney Law Review 432, 473. 
116 [1989) 1 All ER 509, 512-513. Sir John Donaldson MR became Lord Donaldson MR between 
the Datafin and Guinness decisions. 
117 Above n 116,539. 
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In particular in considering whether something has gone wrong the court is 
concerned whether what has happened has resulted in real injustice. If it has, 
then the court has to intervene, since the panel is not entitled to confer on 
itself the power to inflict injustice on those who operate in the market which 
it supervises. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in the recent Cameron decision agreed, albeit 
in obiter, with this highly flexible approach: 118 
Decisions of unincorporated bodies exercising public regulatory functions may not 
easily fall for examination on conventional grounds of illegality, irrationality and 
procedural impropriety. In appropriate cases a more flexible approach may be 
called for. 
The following analysis deals with the applicability of the traditional principles of 
judicial review to self-regulatory bodies. 
1 Illegality 
(a) Misinterpretation 
Illegality traditionally includes the situation where the decision-maker misinterprets 
his or her powers as conferred by statute. In the context of self-regulatory bodies, 
the courts would apply this ground by determining whether the self-regulatory 
body has interpreted its governing code of practice correctly. The ground of 
illegality is usually concerned with the accurate literal interpretation of precise 
statutory language. However the codes under which self-regulatory bodies operate 
do not lend themselves to such technical scrutiny. This is partly because they have 
been drafted by non-lawyers in many cases. The codes are intended as guidelines, 
not rigid rules. They are intended to be interpreted according to their spirit rather 
than in strict compliance with the principles of statutory interpretation. 119 This 
allows self-regulatory bodies the degree of flexibility required to consider each 
118 Above n 33, 12. 
119 Above n 21, 332; above n 6, 7. 
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case on its individual merits. It means that member organisations may not avoid 
the standards of the code by finding legal loop-holes. If the courts were to apply 
the illegality ground strictly, this could undermine these important advantages of 
self-regulation by forcing self-regulatory bodies to take a legalistic approach to 
their codes. The courts should therefore apply the concept of illegality in such a 
way as to afford the self-regulatory body in question a high degree of discretion 
in interpreting its own code. This approach was advocated by Sir John Donaldson 
MR in Data.fin, who believed that the court should only find illegality (in the pubic 
law sense) if the body's interpretation was so far removed from the natural and 
ordinary meaning of its code that thos·e relying on its decisions could reasonably 
be mislead. 120 Another reason for rejecting a strictly technical approach to the 
ground of illegality in respect of self-regulatory bodies is that these bodies, or the 
industries within which they operate, can easily amend their codes. They could 
therefore nullify the effect of a judicial review decision based on a strict 
interpretation of their codes by making the necessary changes. 121 The 
Advertising Standards Complaints Board, for example, responded to the Court of 
Appeal's finding in Cameron that public education advertisements were outside its 
jurisdiction by amending its code so as to bring these advertisements within its 
jurisdiction. 
(b) Bad faith 
There is no reason why the judicial review ground of bad faith, another aspect of 
illegality, should not be applied in respect of the decision-making processes of self-
regulatory bodies. The notion of bad faith arises in many areas of law, both 
public and private. It does not presuppose a statutory basis to the exercise of 
power under review. 
(c) Improper purpose 
There is an abuse of power when a power is exercised otherwise than for the 
120 Above n 13, 841. 
121 Lord Donaldson MR identified the difficulty of applying the ground of illegality to a body which 
is both "legislator" and "interpreter" in Guinness, above n 116, 512. 
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purpose for which it was conferred. The difficulty in determining the proper 
purpose in the absence of an enabling statute may be overcome by considering the 
proper purpose of self-regulatory bodies to be the promotion of the public interest. 
This would, however, be a very strict standard against which to assess an entity's 
decision-making process. Governmental bodies purportedly act in the public 
interest, yet the courts do not demand that their decision-making processes 
demonstrate this aim in respect of every decision which is challenged. 
Although it may be difficult to apply the improper purpose facet of the ground of 
illegality in judicial review of a self-regulatory body, it should not be excluded 
altogether. The ground may be highly relevant in situations where the code under 
which a particular self-regulatory body operates explicitly states its objectives. 122 
(d) Relevancy 
The relevancy grounds of review represent yet another aspect of illegality. A 
decision may be challenged on the basis that the decision-maker failed to take a 
mandatory relevant consideration into account. Alternatively, judicial review could 
be sought on the ground that the decision was influenced by an irrelevant 
consideration. The exercise of a statutory power has traditionally been integral to 
the application of the relevancy grounds of review. The criteria of relevancy have 
been supplied by the literal interpretation of the power conferring provisions as 
well as the scope and purpose of the empowering statute. The relevancy grounds 
are most readily applied where the power in question is narrowly defined. It 
becomes more difficult to determine what is relevant and what is not where there 
is a broad discretion associated with the power, as in an exercise of the 
prerogative. 123 Since the powers exercised by self-regulatory bodies may also 
be cast very broadly, they may not always lend themselves to the relevancy 
grounds of review. Lord Donaldson MR recognised this difficulty in Guinness: 124 
122 The Ministry of Consumer Affairs encourages the inclusion of a statement of objectives in self-
regulatory codes of practice. Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 5, 7. 
123 Above n 115, 468-469. 
124 Above n 116, 512. 
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[Flailing to take account of relev~t factors or taking account of irrelevant 
factors, is a difficult concept in the context of a body which is itself charged with 
the duty of making a judgment on what is and what is not relevant, although 
clearly a theoretical scenario could be constructed in which the panel acted on the 
basis of considerations which on any view must have been irrelevant or ignored 
something which on any view must have been relevant. 
The difficulty of applying the relevancy grounds of judicial review to self-
regulatory bodies must not be overstated. It seems unlikely that any self-
regulatory body would have absolute discretion to determine which factors were 
relevant to a decision and which were not. Some factors could clearly be said to 
be relevant or not, having regard to the stated purpose of the governing code and 
the purported aim of self-regulatory bodies which is to further the public interest. 
The code of practice may clearly specify relevant considerations, such as in the 
case of the Banking Ombudsman's terms of reference. Clause 16 states that in 
making a recommendation or award against a participating bank, the Ombudsman 
must have regard to "any applicable rule of law or relevant judicial authority" and 
"the general principles of good banking practice and any relevant code of 
practice". The relevancy grounds of review would therefore be applicable. 
2 Irrationality 
The ground of irrationality or Wednesbury unreasonableness could be applied to 
self-regulatory bodies without conceptual strain. Indeed there may be less 
theoretical objection to such application than when it is used in judicial review of 
statutory power. A decision may be challenged for irrationality or Wednesbury 
unreasonableness when the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-
maker could ever have come to it. Although the test allows a high degree of 
discretion to the decision-maker, the ground is inherently concerned with the 
substantive merits of a particular decision. The ground thus threatens the 
distinction between appeal and review, which legitimates judicial intervention into 
the exercise of statutorily conferred power. Since the power wielded by self-
regulatory bodies is not derived from Parliament, review of the exercise of this 
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power does not involve a threat to the separation of powers or parliamentary 
sovereignty doctrines. 
Although the courts need not be concerned with the constitutionality of applying 
the judicial review ground of irrationality to self-regulatory bodies, they must 
avoid replacing the decisions of these bodies with their own too lightly. A heavy-
handed approach to the review of these entities for irrationality could introduce 
such a level of uncertainty as to make the self-regulatory system unworkable. The 
public and members of the regulatory scheme would lose confidence in the validity 
of the self-regulatory body's decisions if the courts were prepared to assess each 
decision on the basis of its substantive merits. In view of the stringent test for 
irrationality and the expertise of self-regulatory bodies in their own particular 
fields of regulation, the courts would probably adopt a highly deferential approach 
when examining their decisions for unreasonableness. 125 
3 Natural justice 
Lord Donaldson MR in Guinness expressed concern about the applicability of 
natural justice, which embraces the concepts of bias and procedural fairness, to the 
Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers. He stated that "what is or is not fair may 
depend on underlying value judgments by the panel. .. " He said that it would be 
difficult to apply the ground of procedural impropriety considering that the [P]anel 
does not have any statutory or other guidance as to its procedures, which are 
intended to be of its own devising. 126 
Lord Donaldson MR, in expressing his concerns about the applicability of the 
natural justice ground of judicial review, arguably again overstated the difficulties 
of applying the traditional grounds of judicial review to self-regulatory bodies. 
125 See C Graham "Self-Regulation" in G Richardson and H Genn (eds) Administrative Law and 
Government Action: The Couns and Alternative Mechanisms of Review (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1994) 189, 202. 
126 Above n 116, 512. 
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The courts should easily be able to apply the principles of natural justice to the 
decision-making processes of self-regulatory bodies in judicial review proceedings. 
Their application by the courts is no longer restricted to the judicial review 
context. The concept of natural justice is relevant to the exercise of non-statutory 
powers. Natural justice requirements .are flexible, depending on the respective 
situation and the impact of an adverse decision upon the particular individual 
affected. The courts should apply the principles of natural justice in a flexible 
way, taking account of the time and other pressures under which self-regulatory 
bodies may operate. Hepburn, in her paper on natural justice requirements of 
commercial arbitration, expressed concern about the potential for natural justice 
to "supersede the regulatory structure of arbitration" if it is aligned with formal 
and adversarial procedures. 127 Similarly, strictly imposed natural justice 
requirements could undermine the advantages of self-regulation which include the 
flexible and informal nature of complaints adjudication under such systems. 
VII JUDICIAL REVIEW REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN RESPECT OF 
SELF-REGULATORY BODIES 
The JAA sets out the remedies available in an action for judicial review. Section 
4 of the J AA states: 
On an application ... for review, the [High Court] may ... by order grant. .. any 
relief that the applicant would be entitled to, in any one or more of the 
proceedings for a writ or order of or in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, or 
certiorari or for a declaration or injunction. 
Section 4(5) of the J AA provides that the court may, instead of granting any of the 
above relief, direct the defendant to "reconsider and determine, either generally 
127 S Hepburn "Natural Justice and Commercial Arbitration" (1993) 21 Australian Business Law 
Review 43, 48. 
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or in respect of any specified matters, the whole or any part of any matter to 
which the application relates". 
The orders of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are "public law remedies" .128 
Certiorari and prohibition are complementary orders. Certiorari quashes a 
decision. It is retrospective. Prohibition has a similar effect but is prospective 
since it is issued in anticipation of an invalid act or decision. Mandamus compels 
performance where there has been a wrongful failure to discharge a legal duty. 
Injunction and declaration, which are also available in private law, are known as 
"ordinary remedies". They were both developed by the courts of equity. 
Injunctions restrain the defendant from doing or continuing to do a wrongful act. 
A declaratory order states the legal position between the parties. There is no legal 
sanction associated with it. Failure to comply with an injunction or any of the 
public law remedies, on the other hand, may attract severe punishment as a 
contempt of court. 
The remedies are all discretionary. 129 This means that the court may refuse 
relief even if the applicant succeeds in his or her challenge of the validity of an act 
or decision. Reasons for withholding" a remedy include: conduct of the plaintiff 
(acquiescence or delay for example), the availability of alternative remedies 
(whether by an appeal procedure by otherwise), prejudice to third parties and 
futility. 130 While there are no legal barriers to the granting of these remedies in 
respect of judicial review of self-regulatory bodies, the courts may choose to tailor 
the exercise of their discretion to avoid frustrating the advantages of self-
regulation. 
128 They are also known as prerogative orders or writs. 
129 Above n 26, s 4(3). 
130 T Gilbertson, P Radich, M Scholtens and J Underwood "Judicial Review" (New Zealand Law 
Society Seminar, Wellington, July 1995) 57-60. 
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Monetary awards are traditionally not available as a judicial review remedy. 131 
If an individual has suffered economic loss as a result of an unreasonable decision 
of a self-regulatory body, that individual cannot be awarded damages in judicial 
review proceedings. This is a major limitation of judicial review as a means of 
remedying grievances. 
Sir John Donaldson MR in Data.fin was faced with the argument that judicial 
review might compromise the Panel's speed and efficiency and the certainty of its 
decisions, and thereby disrupt the financial markets which it controlled. He 
addressed this by proposing a restrictive approach to the courts' discretionary 
power to grant remedies. Sir John suggested that if the Panel based a decision on 
a misinterpretation of its own rules, the court would not necessarily quash the 
decision. Rather, the court might give only declaratory guidance. 132 (One can 
only speculate as to whether Sir John would take a firmer position if the Panel 
repeated the error following such declaratory guidance.) Sir John described the 
relationship between the Panel and the courts as "historic rather than 
contemporaneous", 133 meaning that the courts would influence future decisions, 
but would not normally quash decisions which the Panel has already made. 
It is interesting to note that Sir John proposed to retain the coercive remedies of 
certiorari and mandamus in respect of breaches of natural justice. 134 He thus 
subordinated the other grounds of review to procedural fairness, which Sir John 
considers to have the status of an enforceable right. 
Sir William Wade has criticised Sir John's proposal to restrict the range of 
remedies available against the Panel on the basis that it would deprive litigants of 
a remedy. 135 He questions the value of extending the scope of judicial review, 
131 Takaro Properties Ltd v Rowling [1978] 2 NZLR 314, 340. This principle was affirmed by the 
House of Lords in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 730 (per Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson). 
132 Above n 13, 841. 
133 Above n 13, 842. 
134 Above n 13, 842. 
135 Above n 65, 439. 
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only to restrict the remedies which may then be granted. 136 Sir Patrick Neill 
agrees with Sir William's criticism of the court's novel proposals relating to 
remedies. He believes that it is the courts' function to grant relief to a successful 
applicant. If a body bases a decision on a misinterpretation of its code, that 
decision should be quashed. Merely providing guidance for the future in the form 
of a declaratory order is unsatisfactory according to Sir Patrick. 137 
The concern that Sir John's restrictive approach to remedies would limit the 
courts' ability to assist successful judicial review applicants is valid. However Sir 
Patrick and Sir William fail to acknowledge the serious consequences for the 
financial markets of making the Panel '·s decisions susceptible to a quashing order. 
One of the consequences would be that market participants could make tactical 
applications for judicial review and take advantage of the delay and uncertainty 
over whether the Panel's decision in question will stand. However, Sir John's 
restrictive approach should not be automatically applied to all self-regulatory 
bodies. The courts must balance the advantages of declaring self-regulatory 
bodies' decisions immune from judicial interference against the injustice of 
withholding a remedy from a successful judicial review applicant. The outcome 
of this balance will depend on the role of each self-regulatory body and the effect 
of introducing uncertainty into the finality of its decisions on the market in which 
it operates. 
vm CONCLUSION 
Self-regulatory bodies may be extremely powerful. As a consequence of exerting 
regulatory power over their member organisations, they may in some 
circumstances seriously affect the rights of third parties who have not voluntarily 
submitted to their jurisdiction. Self-regulation has a number of advantages. The 
136 Above n 65, 440. 
137 Sir p Neill "A Reply to Professor Sir William Wade's 'New Horizons in Administrative Law'" 
(9th Commonwealth Law Conference, Auckland, April 1990) 443, 445. 
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lack of accountability of self-regulatory bodies is, however, a significant 
disadvantage. Since industry self-regulation is likely to become an increasingly 
common phenomenon in New Zealand's deregulated economy, the question of 
whether the acts and decisions of self-regulatory bodies should be judicially 
reviewable needs to be addressed. 
Whether any particular self-regulatory body is subject to the judiciary's public law 
supervisory jurisdiction is unclear. The New Zealand courts have indicated a 
willingness to subject some self-regulatory bodies to judicial review, however they 
have not clearly articulated the justification for doing so. The question of whether 
these entities should be held to public law standards of decision-making challenges 
the basis of the distinction between public and private law. The fact that the 
courts have been unable to devise a conceptually coherent test for amenability of 
self-regulatory bodies to judicial review indicates that they have lost sight of a 
coherent basis for the distinction. 
Public law principles should apply to those entities which exist to serve the public 
interest. The imposition of the onerous standards of public law decision-making 
is justified since this furthers the public good. The impact on the individual 
liberties of such entities is of secondary importance since they themselves 
subordinate their own individual gain to the public interest. Although self-
regulatory schemes are beneficial to the industries in which they operate, their 
primary purpose is to further the public interest. Indeed this is the basis upon 
which industries operating self-regulatory schemes fend off government regulation. 
Since these entities are self-professedly acting in the public interest, their acts and 
decisions should be subject to judicial review. 
Despite having evolved in the context of the exercise of statutory power, the 
traditional grounds of judicial review are generally relevant to exercises of private 
power by self-regulatory bodies. The courts must, however, be aware of the 
environment in which these entities operate and apply the grounds with an 
appropriate degree of deference. The indiscriminate application of the grounds 
50 
could undermine the advantages of self-regulation. The courts should not adopt 
the "blanket" approach to the grounds of judicial review of self-regulatory bodies 
advocated by the English and New Zealand courts. This would result in a high 
degree of uncertainty as to whether a particular decision of a self-regulatory body 
is open to challenge. 
The courts are lagging behind in their approach to the proper application of public 
law principles. They are fumbling with the vague concept of a "public function" 
as a test of amenability to judicial review and seem unable to define their role in 
controlling decentralised processes of public interest decision-making. This 
situation illustrates Sir lvor Richardson's observation that the paradigms of legal 
thought no longer reflect New Zealand's social, political and economic 
realities. 138 
138 See above n 4. 
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